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CASE NOTES

TAXATION-INDIAN TRUST PROPERTY--STATE INHERITANCE TAX-THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY BY PAYING
OKLAHOMA ESTATE TAX ON THE PROPERTY OF A NONCOMPETENT OSAGE
INDIAN WITHOUT DETERMINING WHETHER INTERVENING CASES AND
INTERNAL REVENUE RULINGS HAD REMOVED THE REQUIREMENT FOR

PAYING THE TAX. Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972),
cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1973) (No. 72-654).
A representative of the federal government, acting as trustee for certain
property of the estate of Rose Mason, a noncompetent Osage Indian, prepared and filed an Oklahoma estate tax return on behalf of her estate.
The administrators of the estate, as plaintiffs in this case, now claim that
the necessity for paying the Oklahoma estate tax on the type of property
involved was so unclear that the federal representative breached his fiduciary duty as trustee in paying the tax before having the matter judicially
determined. The United States Government, as defendant, claims that the
trust obligation was not breached because the payment was based on a 1948
Supreme Court case which approved the payment of the same tax involved
in the instant case. Held-Judgment for plaintiff. The United States
breached its fiduciary duty by paying Oklahoma estate tax on the property
of a noncompetent Osage Indian without determining whether intervening
cases and Internal Revenue rulings had removed the necessity of paying
the tax.
The nature of the federal-Indian relationship must be briefly explained
to aid in understanding the legal status of Indian lands and why attempted
state taxation of such lands creates judicial problems. An often cited authority on the federal attitude towards Indians is Worcester v. Georgia.' In
that case Chief Justice Marshall held that the Indian territories constituted
entities completely separate from the states, and that all business with Indians should be carried on solely by the United States. 2 In another case he
3
likened the federal-Indian relationship to that of guardian and ward.
Statute replaced treaty as the method of dealing with Indians in 1871, 4 and
since then official policy has vacillated between attempts at creating selfsufficient tribal units and assimilating Indians into the American culture. 5
1. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832).

The case involved attempted en-

forcement of a state statute regulating access of white men to Indian land. Chief
Justice Marshall found the basis of federal power over Indians in the Constitution,
federal laws, treaties, and history. Id. at 544-61, 8 L. Ed. at 498-501.
2. Id. at 557-59, 8 L. Ed. at 499-500. Indian tribal properties were thought of as
constituting sovereign nations, and this analogy is borne out by the fact that Indians
were long dealt with by treaty agreement.

3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17, 8 L. Ed. 25, 31 (1831).
4. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1970)).

5. See generally Comment, State Taxation of Indian Income, 1971 LAw & Soc.
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Today, the federal government remains the main regulatory body over Indians, 6 and an area in which it is still involved to a great extent is that of
turning ownership of tribal lands over to the Indians themselves.
Through various enactments, the federal government has adopted the use
of individual allotment of Indian tribal lands to settle the questions of use
and ownership of the lands. The basic legislation in the area is the General
Allotment Act of 1887.7 Any tribe coming under the Act had the land
belonging to it "patented" to individual members of the tribe. s The land was
to be held in trust for 25 years, a period which has since been extended. 9
Upon either the individual Indian being declared competent, or the end of
the trust period, the land is to be conveyed in fee to the individual allottee,
free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever. 10 Although the Osage tribe
was specifically excluded from the General Allotment Act," arrangements
for land and mineral right distribution were made in a separate act in 1906.12
The tax policies regarding the lands and mineral rights held by the federal
government have changed and evolved through the years.
The instrumentality theory, grounded on the idea that a state could not
tax a means (instrumentality) that the federal government was using to
achieve a stated goal, was long a basis for denying direct taxation of Indian
ORDER 355, 358-59; Comment, Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present
Problems, 59 CALnF. L. REv. 1261-66 (1971).
6. States have been granted some specific authority over sanitation, health, and

school attendance enforcement. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).

Also, Public Law 280 pro-

vides for some states to have jurisdiction over criminal matters on reservations, if the
tribe so consents. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, Act of
Apr. 11, 1968, § 401(a), 82 Stat. 78 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970)).
7. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §H 331-34,
339, 341-42, 348-49 (1970)). Each tribal member received rights to up to 80 acres of
agricultural land or 160 acres of grazing land. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
8. The term 'patent," as used in the Act, was an unfortunate use of the word.
The "patents" issued in conformity with the statutes only entitled the holder to a conveyance of the land represented by the patent, on the occurrence of one of several
happenings. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 436, 23 S. Ct. 478, 480, 47 L.
Ed. 532, 535 (1903).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970). The trust periods have been extended by various
executive orders as provided for in the Act. See historical notes, Id.
10. Id. Competence in reference to Indians is equated with being able to manage
one's own affairs. Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert.
granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1973) (No. 72-654).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 339 (1970).
12. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539. Under the act each specially enrolled Osage Indian received a 160-acre homestead plus an equal share of excess land.
The homestead was made inalienable and nontaxable until further act of Congress.
Although the land will be turned over at the end of the trust period, or when the individual is declared to be competent, the homestead is to remain inalienable and nontaxable for an additional 25 years.
While the land was allotted individually, the mineral rights were to be held in trust
for the tribe as a whole. Each specially enrolled tribal member became entitled to
1/2229th share of the distributable income from the sale of the minerals. These
shares are called headrights.
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trust land.' 3 This theory, along with the special federal-Indian relationship,
served to foster an assumption of general nontaxability of Indian trust property. Just prior to, and immediately following the abandonment of the instrumentality theory, 14 the courts started to inspect more closely the widely
allowed Indian trust tax exemptions. It was held that income earned on
trust fund income was subject to federal income tax, 15 and later that since
taxation of the transfer of property is based upon a different end than direct
taxation of property, no extension of tax exemptions to include transfer of
property could be found in the acts of Congress regarding Indians.' 6 During this period, however, trust property held by noncompetent Indians was
considered to be not subject to federal income tax."
The problem of state inheritance taxation of Indian trust property was
specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in 1942, and again in 1948.
The decision of Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States' s held that
Oklahoma could impose an estate tax on restricted property of an Osage Indian. The Court reached its decision on two grounds; first, that the legislative history of the Osage Allotment Act could not sustain an intention to
grant such a tax exemption, and second, that the normal rule against tax
exemption through statutory implication should be applied. 19 This decision
was extended in West v. Oklahoma Tax Commission20 to include trust property of a noncompetent Osage Indian. The court stated that the basic reason for not extending the few exemptions given by the Osage Allotment
Act was that an inheritance tax rests on a different basis than a tax levied
on the property itself, in that an inheritance tax is imposed on the shifting
13. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437, 23 S. Ct. 478, 480, 47 L. Ed. 532,
536 (1903). This case involved an attempt to directly tax Indian trust property, and
the court held that trust property "is part of the national policy by which the Indians are to be maintained .

. .

. To tax these lands is to tax an instrumentality em-

"
ployed by the United States for the benefit and control of this dependent race ....
The theory comes from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed.
579 (1819).
14. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386, 58 S. Ct. 623,
627, 82 L.Ed.907, 914 (1938).
15. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418, 55 S.
Ct. 820, 79 L. Ed. 1517 (1935).
16. Landman v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 810 (1942).
17. Chouteau v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 976 (1930), aff'd on other grounds, 283
U.S. 691, 51 S. Ct. 598, 75 L. Ed. 1353 (1931).
18. 319 U.S. 598, 63 S. Ct. 1284, 87 L. Ed. 1612 (1943). The term "restricted
property" refers to property for which title has passed to the individual Indian, but
on which rules against alienation remain. The United States retains title for property
which is being held in trust.
19. Id. at 605, 63 S. Ct. at 1287, 87 L. Ed. at 1617. The Court stated that if
Congress had desired any additional tax exemptions, it could have said so unambiguously. Accord, Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418,
420, 55 S. Ct. 820, 822, 79 L. Ed. 1517, 1519 (1935).
20. 334 U.S. 717, 68 S. Ct. 1223, 92 L. Ed. 1676 (1948).
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of economic benefits rather than on the property of which the estate is composed. 21 This case is the last Supreme Court decision on the permissibility
of imposition of a state inheritance tax on Indian trust property.
Since the West decision a number of courts have spoken on problems

22
closely related to West. The leading case is tlat of Squire v. Capoeman,
where the Court dealt with an attempt to hold income from the sale of timber from Quinaielt alloted lands subject to a capital gains tax. The Court
used two sections of the General Allotment Act and a statement of lenient
policy towards Indians, as expressed in Worcester v. Georgia, to imply a tax
exemption. 23 It implied from these three things that until land is transferred
to an individual Indian, an allotment should be free from all taxes in order
to effectuate the stated policy of bringing Indians to the desired state of

independence.24
Squire has been the focal point for later cases in extending Indian tax
exemptions on trust property even further. In one case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California could not impose an inheritance tax on allotted lands of noncompetent Mission Indians. 25 In another
case, it was held that royalty income from Osage tribal mineral deposits
credited to individual trust accounts was exempt from federal income tax.2 6
21. Id. at 727, 68 S. Ct. at 1228, 92 L. Ed. at 1682. The fact that the corpus of
the trust could be depleted by repeated tapping was discounted by the Court, since that
was said to be the intended consequences of inheritance taxes.
22. 351 U.S. 1, 10, 76 S. Ct. 611, 617, 100 L. Ed. 883, 890 (1956).
23. Id. at 6-7, 76 S. Ct. at 616, 100 L. Ed. at 888-89. The Act stated both that
land would be finally transferred free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever, and
that on declaration of competence, a fee simple for land allotted would be given and
thereafter all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance, or taxation would be removed. 25

U.S.,C. §§ 348-49 (1970).

• Chief Justice Marshall stated that "the language used in treaties with the Indians
should never be construed to their prejudice." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 582, 8 L. Ed. 483, 508 (1832), quoted in Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 7,
76 S. Ct. 611, 616, 100 L. Ed.883, 889 (1956).
24. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 8-9, 76 S. Ct. 611, 616, 100 L. Ed. 883,
889-90 (1956).
25. Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1957). The land involved in this
case was allotted under the Mission Indian Act, which provided that at the end of
the trust period land would be conveyed free of all charges and encumbrances.
Mission Indian Act of Jan. 12, 1891, ch. 65, 26 Stat. 712. The court reasoned that on
the basis of Squire the land involved was exempt from direct taxation, and since
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. West stated that land exempt from direct taxation would
also be exempt from state inheritance taxes, the land in question was exempt from
California estate taxes. Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 1957).
26. Big Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The court, by
analogy to Squire, used a 1938 amendment to the Osage Allotment Act to imply a tax
exemption. Id. at 769. The amendment states that "[A]ll royalties and bonuses
arising therefrom [the Osage mineral property] . . . shall be disbursed to members
of the Osage Tribe or their heirs ......
[Emphasis added.] Act of June 24, 1938,
ch. 645, § 1, 52 Stat. 1034.
The Big Eagle court followed Squire in resolving ambiguities in favor of the Indians
and disregarding the usual need for clear expression in order to allow tax exemptions,
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The instant case has used the Squire decision and the lower court cases,
along with Internal Revenue rulings as a basis for disregarding the West
case. 27 While admitting that a court cannot refuse to follow a higher court
ruling directly in point because it disagrees with the reasoning used in a
particular case, the court states that where the underpinnings of a decision
have been weakened, a lower court may disregard it. 28 The court contends
that just such a weakening has occurred in the authority for this case, as it
states:
There has been a marked change in the evaluation of the reasons
given by the court for its result in West. . . and there has also been a
considerable increase in the kinds of taxes with respect to which restricted Indian property has been held immune. In several crucial
aspects the essential bases of West have been so weakened
that, in our
29
opinion, the decision no longer stands as authoritative.
The court feels that Squire reversed the holdings of the West decision when
it stated that the words of the General Allotment Act might be sufficient
in themselves to bar all taxation of allotted trust property. This is considered to be strong enough authority to disregard the West holding that possible depletion of Indian trust property through repeated payment of state
death taxes is immaterial.30 It was also held to do away with the need for
specific indications from Congress before Indian property could be made tax
exempt. 31 The Mason court adds that West may have been overruled because of the intervening rulings holding that trust property and income is
32
not subject to direct taxation.
Despite the several reasons given by the court in Mason for disregarding
the rule of West, Judge Skelton, in his dissent, points to some troublesome
facts. He first notes that the West case has not been overruled, and that it is
The decision of United States v. Hallam, 304 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1962) held that income derived from Quapaw lands allotted under a special act was exempt from income taxation. Nash v. Wiseman, 227 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1963) extended
federal estate tax exemption to land allotted under the General Allotment Act.
But see Shelton v. Lockhart, 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957).

27. The Internal Revenue Service has responded to the holding of the Squire
case through several rulings. Rev. Rul. 164, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 220 directed that
trust property held under the General Allotment Act be exempted from federal estate
tax. This was extended to property held under the Osage Allotment Act by a Techni-

cal Advice Memorandum, August 15, 1969, to the District Director of Internal Revenue
in Oklahoma City. Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1972),
cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1973) (No. 72-654).

28. Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364, 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. granted, 41
U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1973) (No. 72-654).
29. Id. at 1375.
30. Id. at 1375.
31. Id. at 1375.
32. Id. at 1378.
The Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States and West v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n cases were based on the assumption that the property involved was subject to federal income and estate tax. The West case stated that the re-

sult would be different if these taxes were not applicable.
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precisely in point on both law and fact for Mason.3 3 He further mentions
that the laws in regard to Osage trust property have not been altered since
West. 34 He would retain the distinction made in West between taxation on
property and taxation on the shifting of property and distinguish the Squire
case in terms of the kind of tax involved (income as opposed to estate)
and the parties involved (living noncompetent as opposed to estate of noncompetent). He further maintains that the lower court rulings discussed
by the majority are not in point because they deal either with different allotment acts or different types of taxes, and that they are not controlling because they are from lower courts. While the majority discusses the necessity for taking the position on the case that they feel would be taken on appeal,3 5 Judge Skelton says that the Court of Claims is in no position to spec36
ulate on what the Supreme Court might do.
It would seem that a close inspection of the various laws enacted by
Congress dealing with the problem of Indian lands should provide guidelines
for allowing or disallowing tax exemptions on the various land and property
held in trust by the federal government. However, the General Allotment
Act does not bring up the subject of tax exemption. The closest the Act
comes to speaking in terms of a tax exemption is that the lands will be
turned over free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever. 37 Since imposition of taxes could lead to liens on the property, this phrase has often been
used to place tax exempt status on trust property. The Osage Allotment
Act does speak specifically of tax exemption on the 160 acres allotted as
a homestead, and extends nontaxability and inalienability for an additional
25 years after the land is turned over to a competent Indian.3 8 The apparent reason for such restrictions is to protect the property from being sold for
satisfaction of debts or tax liens, so as to assure the individual Indians a
base for economic development. This specific tax exemption, combined
with the wording of various amendments to the Osage Allotment Act to the
effect that all royalties and bonuses shall be turned over to the competent
Indians, has now been interpreted to imply that no taxes may be levied on
any trust property or income therefrom. The General Allotment Act and
Osage Allotment Act have been taken as pari materia3 9 and decisions on one
have been used as authority for decisions involving the other because of the
one overall federal policy towards Indians. The courts have ignored, how33. Id. at 1379.
34. Id. at 1379.
35. Id. at 1378.
36. Id. at 1381.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
38. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 2, 34 Stat. 542.
39. Big Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765, 771 (Ct. C1. 1962); accord, Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1957). Laws which are pari materia
must be construed with reference to each other.
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ever, some further language in the Osage Allotment Act which might be interpreted to show congressional intent to not make trust property tax exempt
across the board. The Act of April 18, 1912 states:
That no lands or moneys inherited from Osage allottees shall be subject to or be taken or sold to secure the payment of any indebtedness
incurred by such heir prior to the time such lands and moneys are
turned over to such heirs .

. .

. Provided further [t]hat nothing

herein shall be 40construed so as to exempt any such property from liability for taxes.
The taxes referred to are not specifically indicated, but these provisions do
show that inalienability and trust status may not necessarily be used to imply
41
extensive tax exemptions.
It seems that the specific problems of narrow or broad interpretation of
the various Indian allotment acts cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather
must be seen in the context of conflicting federal policies. On the one
hand, the official method of dealing with statutes which regard Indians is
one of leniency, while the normal method of handling tax exemptions is
that they should never be implied. These two policies must be balanced by
every court which decides whether or not to allow Indian tax exemptions
which have not been specifically spelled out. The policy of leniency, as
stated by Chief Justice Marshall, has often been used by courts in justifying
exemptions, 42 but a different attitude was shown in 1935 by a case which
stated that taxation of income from trust funds of an Indian ward is not so
inconsistent with the relationship of guardian and ward that exemption is a
necessary implication. 43 This set the scene for the strong tone of the West
decision which insisted on affirmative language before a tax exemption could
be allowed. 44 The Squire case, however, and those following it, have reembraced the words of Chief Justice Marshall and given the special Indian
40. Act of Apr. 18, 1912, ch. 83, § 7, 37 Stat. 86. Another amendment authorized the payment of certain funds after payment of taxes. Act of June 24, 1938,
ch. 645, 52 Stat. 1034. However, the same amendment stipulates payment of all
royalties and bonuses on declaration of competence. Id. § 3, 52 Stat. at 1035.
41. These special references to taxes may also indicate an attempt to treat the
division of mineral headrights in a manner different from those acts in which land
division alone is encountered. If this is so, the conclusions drawn by several cases
that all Indian allotment acts are pari materia are not valid, and the Squire decision
could only be extended to tribes covered by the General Allotment Act.
42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582, 8 L. Ed. 483, 508 (1832);
e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 7, 76 S. Ct. 611, 615, 100 L. Ed. 883, 889 (1956);
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, 32 S. Ct. 565, 569, 56 L. Ed. 941, 946 (1912).
43. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418, 421,
55 S. Ct. 820, 822, 79 L. Ed. 1517, 1519-20 (1935). This case held that income
derived from trust income was subject to federal income tax. Another case, in allowing the imposition of an income tax on trust property stated that wardship, without
more, does not render an Indian immune from the common burden. Landman v.
Commissioner, 123 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 810 (1942).
44. West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717, 727, 68 S. Ct. 1223, 1228,
92 L. Ed. 1676, 1682 (1948).
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relationship to the federal government an interpretation which again includes
tax exemptions.
It becomes apparent that the courts have followed influences external to
the statutes themselves in arriving at different rulings through the years on
basically the same set of laws. The courts have reflected the varying public
attitudes towards Indians in their decisions. While earlier dealings with the
Indians may have reflected some of the desire for appeasement which prevailed because of the complete ruination of the Indians' ways of life, the
middle decisions of West and Oklahoma Tax Commission mirrored an
era of sweeping tax reform and a desire to do away with tax privileges.
Mason reflects the recent national embarrassment of finding that many Indians are still dependent on the federal government in the context of a
guardian-ward relationship and that in an era of sweeping social reform
45
the Indian has been the forgotten man.
It seems a pity to leave the Indian at the mercy of a court's sentiments.
More definite legislation in the entire area of the federal-Indian trust relationship would prove beneficial to both sides, and would relieve the courts
of making decisions in what is clearly legislative territory. 46 Until such legislation is passed, the courts, in continuing to interpret the laws which do
exist, should consider the moving factors behind the federal-Indian relationship in making their decisions. Whether the goal is assimilation or ethnocentric independence, neither end can be achieved by reducing the value
of the Indians' main assets, which is the land they have and what is taken
from it.4 7 To continue to allow repeated tapping of these resources through
the imposition of inheritance taxes is of benefit to no one. Justice Murphy,
in his dissent in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States,48 placed the
problem in proper perspective when he said:
I dissent because the opinion of the Court rejects a century and a
half of history. We are not here dealing with mere property or income
that is tax exempt. This is not the ordinary case of government and its
citizens, or a group of citizens who seek to avoid their obligations.
Our concern here is entirely different. It is with a people who are
our wards and towards whom Congress has fashioned a policy of protection due to obligations well known to us all.
Phyllis Wilson Gainer
45. "The first Americans-the Indians-are the most deprived and most isolated
minority group in our nation. On virtually every scale of measurement-employment,
income, education, health-the condition of the Indian people ranks at the bottom."

Excerpts from President Nixon's Message on Indian Affairs, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1971,
at 1, col. 8, quoted in Comment, The Problems of Indian Poverty: The Shrinking
Land Base and Ineffective Education, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 143 (1971).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
47. Tuttle, Economic Development of Indian Lands, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 319,

321 (1971).

48. 319 U.S. 598, 612, 63 S. Ct. 1284, 1291, 87 L. Ed. 1612, 1621 (1943).
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